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2I. Introduction
This paper revisits the issues in the optimal currency area literature, as in Mundell (1961) and a
more recent literature, on the optimal choice of an exchange rate regime. What are the costs of a
￿xed exchange rate regime when there is a role for stabilization policy? We address this question
allowing for heterogeneity in the shocks and the response to them, restrictions on the mobility of
factors and incompleteness of asset markets, as is standard in the optimal currency area literature.
The main di⁄erence of our approach is that we take into account that ￿scal instruments may be
used fully for stabilization policy, in the absence of independent monetary.
When di⁄erent shocks hit di⁄erent countries or when there are di⁄erences across countries in
the e⁄ects of shocks, monetary policy, that has a stabilization role because of some form of nominal
rigidity, may have to react di⁄erently in the di⁄erent countries. Because of this heterogeneity it
is common to infer that there are costs of coordinating monetary policies, either through a ￿xed
exchange rate regime or a monetary union. In the literature, these costs are taken to be higher
the stronger are the asymmetries, the more severe are the nominal rigidities, the more pronounced
is the incompleteness of international asset markets, the less mobile is labor, and, ￿nally, the less
able is ￿scal policy in e⁄ectively stabilizing the national economies (Corsetti, 2005).
We show that when both ￿scal and monetary policies are considered jointly with the same
￿ exibility in response to shocks, the loss of the country speci￿c monetary tool is of no cost. This is
true irrespective of the asymmetry in shocks or response to these and the severity of the nominal
rigidities. The elements that are crucial in assessing the costs of a single monetary policy are the
two last ones in the list by Corsetti above, but labor mobility works in the opposite way to the
conventional wisdom. Fiscal and monetary policy are able to eliminate the costs of a monetary
union only if labor is not mobile across countries.We consider a standard two country model. Each country specializes in the production
of a composite tradeable good, which aggregates a continuum of goods produced using labor only.
Labor is not mobile across countries. Money is used for transactions according to a cash-in-advance
constraint on the purchases of the two composite goods by the households of each country. The
government of each country must ￿nance exogenous expenditures on the good produced at home
with distortionary taxes and seigniorage. The tax instruments are standard state-contingent la-
bor income and consumption taxes. There is state-contingent private debt inside each country
in zero net supply and noncontingent nominal public debt in each currency that can be traded
internationally.
We start by analyzing a benchmark economy where prices are ￿ exible (sections 2 and 3).
We show, in Section 3, that any equilibrium allocation in the ￿ exible price, ￿ exible exchange rates,
economy can be implemented with ￿scal and monetary policies that induce stable producer prices
and ￿xed exchange rates. This result has implications for economies with nominal rigidities and
￿xed exchange rates (Section 4). For those policies, that under ￿ exible prices keep prices constant,
if ￿rms were restricted in the setting of prices such as in Calvo (1983), those restrictions would be
irrelevant and the same allocations could still be implemented. It follows that under sticky prices
and ￿xed exchange rates it is always possible to achieve the same allocations as when prices are
￿ exible and exchange rates are also ￿ exible.
Under sticky prices there are allocations other than the ones achieved under ￿ exible prices.
It could still be the case that the allocation with the highest welfare would be amongst these. We
show that this is not the case. Independently of the exchange rate regime, for each allocation
that can be implemented under sticky prices there is one under ￿ exible prices that can potentially
improve welfare in both countries. The reason for this is that in order for sticky prices to be
2relevant, because di⁄erent ￿rms face di⁄erent price setting restrictions, ￿rms that use the same
technology and face the same demand conditions will charge di⁄erent prices. This means that
production will be ine¢ cient and the ine¢ ciency in production is not optimal in this second best
environment. This result relates to the one in Diamond Mirrlees (1971) that shows that it is not
optimal to tax intermediate goods when there are consumption taxes on the ￿nal goods.
When prices are sticky, one would think that ￿ exible exchange rates would be useful in
adjusting the relative price of goods to di⁄erent shocks. Monetary policy would change with shocks
so as to induce the response of the exchange rate that would a⁄ect directly the relative price of
goods. In our model, because we allow for consumption taxes the relative price is the ratio of prices
gross of consumption taxes, adjusted by the nominal exchange rate. When the exchange rate is
￿xed, consumption taxes have a direct e⁄ect on the relative price and change in response to shocks
so that the necessary adjustments take place. Labor income taxes will also have to be adjusted so
that other margins may not be a⁄ected. The change in ￿scal policy is not automatic and would
require a knowledge of the model and the shocks to be fully e⁄ective. But neither would the change
in exchange rates that would be necessary to accomplish the same goal.
Exchange rate policy can play other roles such as completing the noncontingent international
￿nancial markets. Again, when the exchange rates are ￿xed, taxes, and interest rates common across
countries, play that same role of allowing for the returns on assets traded internationally to vary
with the shocks.
The ￿rst result that it is possible to implement the set of allocations under ￿ exible prices,
with constant prices and constant exchange rates is obtained in the model where labor is not
mobile across countries. It does not hold in an alternative model where agents can work outside
their country (Section5). This implies that if prices are sticky there will be costs of restricting
3monetary policy to be a single one for the di⁄erent countries. As mentioned above this result
goes against the standard intuition in the optimal currency area literature. The intuition for our
result is simple. Labor mobility imposes additional equilibrium restrictions, in particular arbitrage
conditions on the choice of where to work, that cannot be satis￿ed with the instruments that we
consider. This of course does not imply that welfare with labor mobility is lower than without it.
Related literature reassesses Milton Friedman (1953)￿ s case for exchange rate ￿ exibility, as
a way of side-stepping the rigidity in relative price movements. Recent examples in the debate are,
for instance, Devereux and Engel (2003) and Duarte and Obstfeld (2005).1 Devereux and Engle
(2003) provide an example with local currency pricing where exchange rate ￿ exibility is of no use.
Because the prices of goods are set in the currency of the consumers, the exchange rate cannot
a⁄ect the relative price and the optimal allocation will be a third best, relative to the optimal
allocation in our model where consumption taxes can be adjusted. Duarte and Obstfeld (2004)
respond, showing that exchange rate ￿ exibility can still be of use in a more complex environment
with non tradeable goods. Even if exchange rate movements cannot a⁄ect the relative price of
goods, they can still a⁄ect the allocations and improve welfare. Because the optimal exchange
rate regime depends on the degree of exchange rate pass-through, it is important to allow for the
decision on which currency prices are set in to be endogenous. Corsetti and Pesenti (2002) do
this and show that there are two self validating regimes, one with ￿xed and another with ￿ exible
exchange rates. The ￿ exible exchange rate regime provides higher welfare. We add to this debate
by showing that the claims hinge on the focus on monetary policy only.2 Once the choice of the
exchange rate regime is considered in the context of the full choice of policy instruments including
tax and debt policy, exchange rate ￿ exibility can be replaced with a gain by ￿scal instruments.
Cooper and Kempf (2004) make a similar point to ours in a very di⁄erent context. They
4explicitly model the Mundellian trade-o⁄ between the bene￿ts of a monetary union in reducing
transaction costs and the costs of the union in the ability to stabilize. Stabilization in their set up
are risk sharing transfers between agents. If the government is able to stabilize using alternative
￿scal instruments, then there are no costs of a monetary union.
In the same direction, but unable to establish the irrelevance results for the lack of ￿scal
instruments are papers such as Gali and Monacelli (2005) and Ferrero (2005). In Gali and Monacelli
(2005) the government chooses the optimal level of public consumption in a monetary union with
lump-sum taxes. Ferrero (2005) considers that lump-sum taxes are not available. The monetary
policy instrument is the interest rate and the ￿scal policy consists in choosing state-noncontingent
public debt and state-contingent taxes on output by ￿rms. In both papers it is established that
the choice of ￿scal policy helps attaining higher welfare. The major di⁄erence between our set up
and the one of Ferrero (2005) is that we consider not only state-contingent labor income taxes but
also consumption taxes.
Other related literature is on optimal ￿scal and monetary policy in small open economies.
Nicolini and Hevia (2004) consider a small open economy with ￿ exible exchange rates and state-
contingent assets. Prices are set in advance. In that set up the second best, ￿ exible price equilibrium
is implementable, but exchange rates must move across states. Benigno and Paoli (2004) is other
related work. They also analyze optimal ￿scal and policy in a small open economy, but in their set
up the optimal ￿ exible price allocation is not implementable.
Finally this paper also relates to Correira, Nicolini and Teles (2002) that analyzes the
Ramsey problem in a closed economy with sticky prices. They show that environments with
di⁄erent sticky price restrictions are equivalent for stabilization purposes, when taxes can be used
with the same ￿ exibility as monetary policy.
5One obvious criticism of our approach is that we do not observe ￿ exible taxes as the model
assumes. This could be relevant if our purpose was to assess the costs of a monetary union without
further institutional reform, but that is not the purpose of this analysis. Our point is that we
should not address the issue of the optimal monetary regime without allowing for alternative ￿scal
regimes. There could be fundamental reasons for taxes not to be state-contingent. But then,
wouldn￿ t those reasons also apply to monetary policy? And yet, we make no apologies for state-
contingent monetary policies.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present a model with ￿ exible prices and
￿ exible exchange rates. In Section 3, we show that the set of implementable allocations in a ￿ exible
world where both prices and exchange rates are ￿ exible can be implemented with constant producer
price levels and ￿xed exchange rates. The result follows that neither sticky prices nor the exchange
rate regime restrict the set of allocations. Furthermore, this set of allocations is optimal. Therefore,
as argued in Section 4, there is no cost of ￿xed exchange rates, independently of the degree or type
of price rigidity. Section 5 addresses the issue of labor mobility showing that with labor mobility
the irrelevance results are not obtained.
II. The Model
The economy has two countries of equal size, the home country and the foreign country. In each
country there is a representative household, a continuum of ￿rms and a government. Each ￿rm
produces a distinct, perishable consumption good with labor only. In each period t = 0;1;:::;T,
where T can be made arbitrarily large,3 the economy experiences one of ￿nitely many events st.
The initial realization s0 is given. The set of all possible events in period t is denoted by St, the
history of these events up to and including period t, which we call state at t, (s0;s1;:::;st), is
6denoted by st, and the set of all possible states in period t is denoted by St. The number of all
possible states in period t is #St. All the relevant variables for this world economy are a function
of the state, st, but to simplify the notation we do not index formally the variables to the state.
There are markets for goods, labor, money, state-contingent debt and state-noncontingent
debt. The labor market is segmented across countries. The state-contingent debt market is
segmented across countries and across households and governments. The goods and the state-
noncontingent debt are tradeable across countries and agents. In this section we assume that ￿rms
set prices every period with contemporaneous information. We also assume that exchange rates
are ￿ exible.
A. The households





Ch;t is the home composite consumption good that aggregates the goods produced by the home









;￿ > 1; (2)
where Ch;t(i) is the consumption of the good produced by ￿rm i. Cf;t is the foreign composite









;￿ > 1: (3)
7There is also a continuum of these ￿rms in the unit interval, indexed by j. Lt is leisure time and
is equal to 1 ￿ Nt; where Nt is total time devoted to production.














h;t is the foreign households composite consumption of the goods produced in the home
country and C￿
f;t is the foreign households composite consumption of the goods produced in the
foreign country.
The households of either country minimize expenditure in the home and foreign goods to





























where Ph;t(i) is the price of the good produced by the home ￿rm i in units of domestic currency,
and P￿
f;t(j) is the price of the good produced by the foreign ￿rm j in units of foreign currency.
Expenditure in either composite good purchased by the home households can then be written as
Z 1
0






Similar expressions are obtained for the households of the foreign country.
8The budget constraints can then be written in terms of the aggregate variables. The repre-
sentative household of the home country at the beginning of each period t = 0;1;:::;T + 1; 4 uses
the nominal wealth Wt to buy Mt (home money), Bh;t (home government noncontingent debt),
Bf;t (foreign government noncontingent debt) and Bt+1 (home private state-contingent debt). The
home government noncontingent debt pays the gross return Rt in the domestic currency at the be-
ginning of the following period, and the foreign government noncontingent debt pays gross return
R￿
t in foreign currency. The price, normalized by the probability of occurrence of the state, at date t
of one unit of domestic currency at a particular state at date t+1 is Qt;t+1: There is no government
state-contingent debt and the home household cannot buy foreign contingent debt. The price of
one unit of foreign currency in units of home currency is "t. Thus, the following restrictions must
be satis￿ed, respectively, for the home and the foreign households,











In the home country there are taxes on the consumption of home produced goods, ￿h;t, on the
consumption of foreign produced goods, ￿f;t, labor income ￿n;t and pro￿ts. As the tax on pro￿ts is
a lump-sum tax it is optimal that all pro￿ts be taxed away, so that the net pro￿ts are zero. There




The wealth home households bring to date t + 1 is
Wt+1 = Mt + Bh;tRt + "t+1Bf;tR￿
t + Bt+1 +
(1 ￿ ￿n;t)WtNt ￿ (1 + ￿h;t)Ph;tCh;t ￿ (1 + ￿f;t)"tP￿
f;tCf;t: (5)
9Money is used to purchase goods according to the following cash-in-advance constraints, for
the home and foreign country, respectively,
(1 + ￿h;t)Ph;tCh;t + (1 + ￿f;t)"tP￿











The households of the home country take prices, policies and initial wealth as given and
choose allocations and asset positions that maximize expected utility (1) subject to the cash-in-
advance constraints (6) and the budget constraints (4) and (5), together with WT+1 ￿ 0. The
households of the foreign country solve a similar problem.
Among the ￿rst order conditions for the home and foreign households are the intertemporal
conditions for the contingent assets,
Qt￿1;t

















, all st￿1 and stjst￿1, 1 ￿ t ￿ T; (9)
the intertemporal conditions for the noncontingent assets,







, all st￿1, 1 ￿ t ￿ T; (10)








, all st￿1, 1 ￿ t ￿ T; (11)
uC￿










, all st￿1, 1 ￿ t ￿ T; (12)
10"t￿1uC￿











, all st￿1, 1 ￿ t ￿ T; (13)





































, all st, 0 ￿ t ￿ T (17)
The budget constraints of the households of each country, (4) and (5), together with the
terminal conditions WT+1 ￿ 0 and W￿
T+1 ￿ 0, can be written as intertemporal budget constraints,





(1 + ￿h;s)Ph;sCh;s + (1 + ￿f;s)"sP￿












= Wt, all st, 0 ￿ t ￿ T;
where Qt;s = Qt;t+1:::Qs￿1;s, t ￿ 0, s ￿ t + 1, and Qt;t = 1.
Using the marginal conditions, as well as the cash in advance constraints, in the intertem-









, all st, 0 ￿ t ￿ T;
(18)


















, all st, 0 ￿ t ￿ T:
(19)
B. The government
The government of each country includes both the ￿scal authority and the monetary authority. We
assume as is standard in this literature that aggregate public expenditures are exogenous. Each
government only consumes goods produced by local ￿rms, and chooses consumption of each good
to minimize expenditure on the aggregate level of expenditures, Gt for the home country and G￿
t,






















where Gh;t(i) is the home government consumption of the good produced by ￿rm i and G￿
f;t(j) is
the foreign government consumption of the good produced in that country by ￿rm j.
The home government issues state-noncontingent debt, Bh;t + B￿
h;t, and money, Ms
t , and
taxes labor income and private consumption, as well as pro￿ts. The nominal ￿nancial liabilities of
the home government at the start of period t are W
g
t, which can be ￿nanced by issuing money and
12public debt
Ms








t + RtBh;t + RtB￿
h;t + Ph;tGt ￿ ￿h;tPh;tCh;t ￿
￿f;t"tP￿
f;tCf;t ￿ ￿n;tWtNt ￿ ￿h;t
where ￿h;t are the pro￿ts of the home ￿rms that are fully taxed. We impose the terminal condition
that government liabilities in the terminal period are zero, W
g
T+1 = 0. The home government


















t, all st, 0 ￿ t ￿ T:
There is a similar condition for the government of the foreign country.
C. Firms
In each country there is a continuum of ￿rms in the unit interval. Each ￿rm produces a distinct,
perishable consumption good with a technology that uses labor only. Each home ￿rm i has the
production technology
Yh;t (i) = AtNt (i); all st, 0 ￿ t ￿ T; (20)
where Yh;t (i) is the production of good i, Nt (i) is the labor used in the production of good i, and
At is an aggregate technology shock in the home country. Good i can be used for private and public
13consumption, Yh;t (i) = Ch;t (i) + C￿
h;t (i) + Gt (i). The technology in the foreign country is
Yf;t (j) = A￿
tN￿
t (j); all st, 0 ￿ t ￿ T; (21)
where the technology parameter A￿
t is the same across ￿rms but can be di⁄erent from At. Each good
j produced in the foreign country can be consumed by households or by the foreign government,
Yf;t (j) = Cf;t (j) + C￿
f;t (j) + G￿
t (j).
Prices are ￿ exible. The ￿rms in the home country choose prices to maximize pro￿ts






Yh;t, all st, 0 ￿ t ￿ T
where Yh;t = Ch;t +C￿
h;t +Gt, obtained using the demand functions of the home good at home and
abroad, and given the production functions (20).






At, all st, 0 ￿ t ￿ T; (22)











t, all st, 0 ￿ t ￿ T: (23)
14D. Equilibrium






























(a) Given the initial wealth levels, prices and policy the households choose the relevant
quantities that solve their problems;
(b) Firms given prices and policy choose the relevant quantities that solve their problems;
(c) For initial public liabilities the governments satisfy their budget constraints;
(d) The markets are in equilibrium:
Ch;t + C￿











Bt+1 = 0 (28)
B￿
t+1 = 0 (29)
The market clearing in the labor and noncontingent bond markets was already imposed.





























are (6) - (19), (22) - (29) and the
15intertemporal budget constraints of the home country that can be obtained by adding up the home
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f;sCf;s ￿ WsNs ￿ ￿h;s
￿
= We




t; are the foreign assets owned by the home country. Using the market clearing









t, all st, 0 ￿ t ￿ T; (31)
III. Equilibria under ￿ exible prices
Our purpose in this section is to assert a major result of the paper that has implications for
equilibrium allocations with sticky prices and ￿xed exchange rates. We show that the set of equi-
librium allocations under ￿ exible prices can be implemented with policies such that the price
level in either country will be constant over time, and such that the nominal exchange rate will







the equilibrium conditions are all satis￿ed with constant producer
price levels in each country equal to arbitrary numbers, and a constant nominal exchange rate, also
equal to an arbitrary number.
The proposition follows:
Proposition 1. Any ￿exible equilibrium allocation can be implemented with Ph;t = Ph;0;
P￿
f;t = P￿
f;0; "t = "0 (and Rt = R￿
t).
16Proof: Without loss of generality we take T = 1. In the beginning of period t = 2 the
assets market opens to liquidate debts. This means that the wealth of the households in period
t = 2, in either country, is zero, W2 = 0 and W￿
2 = 0.








0;1, in the set de￿ned above. We show that there are constant prices with Ph;t = Ph;0; P￿
f;t = P￿
f;0;
and ￿xed exchange rates, "t = "0, which implies that Rt = R￿
t, that satisfy the equilibrium equations
for that allocation which are (6) - (19), (22) - (29) and (31).
First, this allocation satis￿es trivially the two feasibility constraints, (24) and (25), as it is
an equilibrium allocation. For given Ph;0; P￿
f;0; "0 we use the remaining equilibrium conditions to
determine the values for the policy variables and remaining prices.
















t, t = 0;1:

























"0 (1 + ￿￿
h;0)
which are satis￿ed by appropriately choosing ￿h;0 and ￿￿
h;0.
17Given a common process for the nominal interest rate
Rt = R￿
t
to be determined later, and ￿h;0 and ￿￿
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Ph;0(1 + ￿h;1)
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to determine ￿h;1, ￿￿
h;1, W1 and W￿
1.




































, t = 0;1
to determine ￿n;t, ￿f;t, ￿￿
n;t, ￿￿
f;t, for t = 0;1.
18We can use the cash in advance constraints
(1 + ￿h;t)Ph;0Ch;t + (1 + ￿f;t)"0P￿










t ;t = 0;1
to determine Mt and M￿
t , for t = 0;1.
The home country intertemporal budget constraints can be used to determine the nominal










which give #S1 interest rates R1 as a function of the value for We
1. Given these values for R1 the



















The ￿ exible price allocation can be supported with constant producer prices for both goods
and a constant exchange rate, for arbitrary initial levels Ph;0; P￿
f;0 and "0. The common interest
rate is a function of the level of the net foreign assets of the home country in period t = 1. This,
for the case of t = 0;1; gives one degree of freedom for We
1.
The proof extends to any ￿nite horizon economy, t = 0;:::;T, with T arbitrarily large.
There are #St￿1 degrees of freedom for We
t for every t = 1;:::;T.￿








librium conditions can be satis￿ed by asset positions, prices and policies such that producer prices
and exchange rates are arbitrary constants, Ph;t = Ph;0; P￿
f;t = P￿
f;0; "t = "0. This means that the
full set of equilibrium allocations can be implemented under ￿xed exchange rates with producer
prices in both countries that are constant over time.
Taxes play a particular role when equilibria have constant producer prices and exchange
rates. Since prices are constant and so is the exchange rate, consumption taxes in one good relative
to the other will have to move if relative prices are to move, which will happen in general if there
are di⁄erent shocks in di⁄erent countries. Consumption taxes play another role, when public debt
is noncontingent, that of replicating state-contingent real debt. We have assumed, as is standard in
this literature, that internationally traded assets are state-noncontingent. Nominal interest rates,
that in a ￿xed exchange rate regime are common across countries, can play the role of replicating
state-contingent international debt. Consumption taxes also a⁄ect the households margin between
consumption and labor. Labor income taxes will have to adjust for those e⁄ects. Since prices are
constant and technologies in the two countries are varying, the nominal wages will have to move
in response to shocks and move di⁄erently in di⁄erent countries. Money supply will also have to
move to respond to shocks to satisfy the cash in advance constraints.
One ￿rst implication of the result in the proposition is that ￿xed exchange rates do not
restrict the set of allocations under ￿ exible prices. This is an interesting result in itself, in particular,
as in our model, when asset markets are incomplete. However, the issue of whether there are costs
of a ￿xed exchange rate regime is typically associated with the presence of some type of price
rigidity, as argued by Friedman (1953). If there are restrictions on how producer prices are set, and
exchange rates are ￿xed, it may be the case that there will be restrictions on the relative prices of
20the goods produced in the di⁄erent countries.
It is particularly surprising that ￿xed exchange rates do not restrict the set of allocations
also when producer prices are constant over time. Can both producer prices and exchange rates be
constant over time? Yes, as long as taxes can change so that the terms of trade, real wages, and
debt levels can move with the shocks.
In the following section we assume that ￿rms are restricted in the setting of prices.
IV. Sticky prices
The model considered above has full ￿ exibility of prices and exchange rates. However, the discussion
of the costs of the exchange rate regime is particularly interesting insofar as there is some type of
nominal rigidity. We now assume that prices are sticky in some or in all goods produced. We start
by showing that there are ￿scal and monetary policies in a ￿xed exchange rate regime that can
achieve any ￿ exible price equilibrium allocation even when there are nominal rigidities that can be
di⁄erent across countries. Proposition 1 will be instrumental to show this result.
Under sticky prices there are allocations other than the ones that can be implemented under
￿ exible prices. However, as we show here, those allocations are dominated in terms of welfare, so
that indeed we can conclude that the ￿xed exchange rate regime is of no cost whether prices are
￿ exible or sticky.
We assume that ￿rms set prices as in Calvo (1983) staggered price setting, which is a
commonly used assumption in the sticky price literature. We assume that the ￿rms set prices in
the currency of their country. In each country, starting from an historical common price, at every
date, each ￿rm can optimally set its price with some probability less than one, that can di⁄er across
countries. Because there is a continuum of ￿rms, the probability is also the share of ￿rms that
21optimally revise the price in each period.
In general, staggered price setting leads to ine¢ cient di⁄erences in prices across ￿rms.
Although in a given country ￿rms are otherwise identical, have the same linear technology and face
identical demand functions, they may charge di⁄erent prices. Thus, the relative price of the goods
they produce may be di⁄erent from one. The only case in which this will not occur is when ￿rms
that in each period have the opportunity of choosing a new price decide to maintain the same price.
The price setting restrictions in this case will not be binding and the producer price level in each
country will be constant. The equilibrium conditions will be identical to the equilibrium conditions
of the ￿ exible price economy when producer prices are constant across periods.
Since, as stated in Proposition 1, under ￿ exible prices it is possible to implement the full
set of equilibrium allocations with constant prices and ￿xed exchange rates, it follows that under
sticky prices it is also possible to implement that same set, also with ￿xed exchange rates.
It is clear that under sticky prices there are allocations that are not implementable under
￿ exible prices. That is the case whenever otherwise identical ￿rms set di⁄erent prices. It turns
out, as we show in the Appendix, that the set of ￿ exible price allocations dominates in terms of
welfare the set of allocations under sticky prices. Since agents are heterogeneous across countries,
the meaning of welfare dominance is the usual one, of a potential Pareto movement where lump
sum transfers between agents are implicitly assumed.
The proposition follows.
Proposition 2. In a world economy with noncontingent bond markets and Calvo (1983) stag-
gered price setting there is no cost of a ￿xed exchange rate regime, independently of the degree of
price rigidity.
22Proof (sketch): In Proposition 1 we show that the set of allocations under ￿ exible prices
is implemented with policies that generate constant prices and exchange rates, equal to arbitrary
numbers. For the policies that induce prices to be equal to the historical initial prices of the Calvo
￿rms, Ph;0 and P￿
f;0, and exchange rates equal to any constant5, the equilibrium conditions under
Calvo (1983) will be exactly the ones under ￿ exible prices. This establishes that the ￿ exible price
set of allocations is feasible with Calvo price setting and ￿xed exchange rates. It remains to show
that the set is optimal, in the sense that for every allocation in the set under sticky prices, there
is one in the set under ￿ exible prices that is a potential Pareto improvement. This is done in the
Appendix.￿
The result in this proposition can be extended to any other form of price stickiness, such
as prices set in advance, Taylor (1980) staggered prices, or Rotemberg (1982) adjustment costs of
changing prices. For the case where prices are set in advance, let the initial prices Ph;0 and P￿
f;0
be exogenously given and the other period prices Ph;t and P￿
f;t be set in advance for k periods, for
a ￿nite k. Proposition 1 implies that adding those restrictions to the ￿ exible price economy still
allows to implement the set of allocations under ￿ exible prices, in a ￿xed exchange rate regime.
The argument of welfare dominance of the ￿ exible price set also applies here.
We have analyzed ￿ exible versus ￿xed exchange rate regimes. The analysis clearly follows
through in a monetary union. The interest rate will be common as under ￿xed exchange rates. The
money supply in each country obviously does not have to be the same.
We have assumed that prices are set in the currency of the producer. We could alternatively
have assumed local currency pricing. The results would follow through. For the policies that support
constant producer prices and constant exchange rates, local currency price setting restrictions would
not have any impact. Contrary to what is argued extensively in the literature that does not allow
23for ￿scal policy instruments, it does not make a di⁄erence whether prices are set in the currency
of the producer or the consumer.
V. Labor mobility
In the literature of optimal currency areas the lack of labor mobility is one of the justi￿cations for
the costs of a monetary union with asymmetric member countries. A result of this paper is that
the opposite is true. Labor immobility is a necessary condition for the irrelevance of the exchange
regime.
Proposition 1 was stated for the case where labor cannot move across countries. It does
not apply when labor is mobile. To see this we assume that workers can choose to work in foreign
￿rms being taxed at home. They consume at home. This is one way of modelling labor mobility.
There are alternative ways but the same arguments go through.
For the home households, total labor Nt is split between work at home Nh;t and work abroad
Nf;t,
Nt = Nh;t + Nf;t. (32)
Similarly for the foreign country, N￿
t is split between N￿
h;t; which is labor in the home country, and
N￿





The market clearing conditions in the goods market, (24), become
Ch;t + C￿















The conditions of the households problem are the same except for an additional arbitrage condition
on where to work, that equates the two wages
Wt = "tW￿
t (36)











= Wt ￿ W
g
t, all st, 0 ￿ t ￿ T;
Notice that full labor mobility implies one additional constraint per state to the equilibrium
conditions. The wage in the same currency must be equal across countries. As shown in the proof
of Proposition 1, there are multiple policies that support each allocation under ￿ exible prices with
constant prices and exchange rates. Under sticky prices and ￿xed exchange rates the degrees of
freedom are the number of states at t ￿ 1, #St￿1, for each period t. These degrees of freedom are
not enough to satisfy the additional equilibrium restrictions, which are as many as the number of
states in t, #St. This is stated in the proposition below.
Proposition 3. When prices are sticky, in a ￿xed exchange rate regime (or monetary union),
labor immobility is a necessary condition to implement the set of ￿exible price equilibrium alloca-
tions.
25Proof: The nominal wages cannot satisfy simultaneously the price setting conditions (22)


















t, all st, 0 ￿ t ￿ T; (38)
and the arbitrage condition
Wt = "0W￿
t . (39)
Therefore the equilibrium allocations under ￿ exible prices and exchange rates with mobile labor
cannot be decentralized with constant exchange rates and producer prices.￿
When labor is mobile, and prices are sticky, the exchange rate regime matters. In particular,
while with ￿ exible exchange rates it is possible to implement the set of allocations under ￿ exible
prices, that is not the case in a ￿xed exchange rate regime.
The fact that with labor mobility there are costs of a ￿xed exchange rate regime, while there
are no such costs when labor is immobile, does not mean that labor mobility is undesirable. We
are not comparing environments with and without labor mobility, but rather environments with
and without ￿xed exchange rates, when labor is immobile or when it is mobile.
VI. Concluding remarks
Under a ￿ exible exchange rate regime, monetary policy in each country can freely respond to shocks;
may respond to country speci￿c shocks or may respond di⁄erently from other countries to common
26shocks. Instead, in a monetary union there is a unique monetary policy for the members of the
union. This implies restrictions in the use of policy; the exchange rate must be constant over time
and the nominal interest rate must be equal across countries. Are these restrictions relevant to
achieve the optimal equilibrium allocations? Does the answer to this question change with the
introduction of nominal rigidities, like staggered price setting?
The conventional wisdom is that there are costs of a ￿xed exchange rate regime, or a
monetary union, resulting from the loss in ability to use policy for stabilization purposes. The
costs are taken to be higher the stronger are the asymmetries across countries in shocks and their
transmission, and the stronger are the nominal rigidities. Instead, we show that in an environment
with nominal rigidities, whatever the type of price setting PCP (producer currency pricing) or
LCP (local currency pricing), the exchange rate regime, whether ￿ exible or ￿xed exchange rates,
is irrelevant once ￿scal policy instruments are taken into account. This is the main result of the
paper. We also show that in order for the costs of the monetary union to be zero labor cannot be
mobile.
One possible objection to our analysis, as well as to the related literature that uses both
￿scal and monetary policy instruments, is that we do not incorporate informational restrictions in
the policy choice and also do not take into account lack of ability to commit. The assumptions
of private information on the part of the government and inability to commit in the presence of a
time inconsistency problem may justify policy that does not respond to contingencies, such as the
in￿ ation cap in the analysis in Athey, Atkeson and Kehoe (2005).
27APPENDIX
In this appendix we show that for each allocation under sticky prices, with ￿ exible exchange
rates, there is an allocation under ￿ exible prices that gives at least as high welfare to one country
without reducing the welfare of the other country.
Assuming that lump sum transfers are feasible between countries, the set of implementable
















































We do not impose as a restriction the budget constraint between countries, because we
allow for transfers between these. The remaining equilibrium conditions determine the policy and
prices. Denote the set of allocations that satisfy these conditions by Ef.
Given Pareto weights there will be an optimal allocation that can be decentralized with
a choice of initial conditions We
0. The Pareto weights can be chosen to be such that the optimal
allocation is implemented with the actual initial We
0.
Under sticky prices the set of equilibrium conditions cannot be summarized by a small set of







28are restricted by the same intertemporal budget constraints as in the ￿ exible price case above, (A.1)









































1￿￿, as well as all the remaining equilibrium conditions. Let the set of alloca-
tions that satisfy these restrictions be denoted by Es.















￿ 1. D = 1 when
Ph;t(i)
Ph;t = 1 and D￿ = 1 when
Pf;t(j)
Pf;t = 1.
The set of allocations under ￿ exible prices dominates the set under sticky prices, meaning
that for each allocation in Es there is at least one allocation in Ef with at least one of the goods
in larger or equal quantity and none smaller. The intertemporal budget constraints are the same
but the feasibility conditions are di⁄erent, being A.5 and A.6 more restrictive than A.3 and A.4,
and there are additional equilibrium restrictions over Es that are absent from Ef. Moreover, the
restrictions over the allocations under sticky prices are exactly the same only when Ph;t (i) = Ph;0
and Pf;t (j) = Pf;0.￿
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311See also Obstfeld (2004) and Duarte (2004).
2On recent work on optimal monetary policy in a currency area see Benigno (2004).
3The assumption of a ￿nite, even if arbitrarily large, time horizon considerable simpli￿es the
analysis and is as reasonable an assumption as the more standard one of an in￿nite horizon.
4Notice that the decision on assets is made also in period T +1, while the last period in which
agents agents produce and consume is T. The assumption that there is an additional subperiod
with an assets market for the clearing of debts guarantees that money has value in a ￿nite horizon
economy. Agents will want to take money to period T + 1 to settle debts, that in the aggregate
must be with the government. If the ￿nite horizon economy ended with a goods market at T, then
sellers would not accept money in period T, and therefore money would not have value, not only
in that period but in every period.
5The exchange rate could be equal to one for the case of a monetary union,
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